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ANTICOMMUNISM VERSUS NONINTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA

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SEP 27 1966

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Anticommunism Versus Nonintervention in Latin America

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SUMMARY

President Monroe asserted in 1823 that any attempt on the part of the Old World Powers to extend their political system to the Western Hemisphere would be considered as dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. During the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine gradually became an effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy. President Theodore Roosevelt extended the doctrine from a protective attitude to one requiring active intervention by the United States into the affairs of any Latin American country that did not maintain itself in proper order. Subsequently, Pan-Americanism grew into the Rio Pact of 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States. The United States and 19 Latin American Republics are committed by those treaties to a collective approach to hemispheric security. Common action, when so ordained by the OAS, is prescribed to meet any threat to the hemisphere, and unilateral intervention by one country into the affairs of another is prohibited.

Communism has made heavy inroads into Latin America and continues to present a serious threat. Yet, common action by the OAS to meet this threat may not be timely or adequate. Accordingly, there appears to be a basic conflict between U.S. determination to contain communism and adherence to a policy of nonintervention.

Neither the OAS nor the United States intervened in Cuba to prevent communism from being implanted 90 miles from the U.S. mainland. Subsequent U.S. actions failed to dislodge Fidel Castro's government. In the Dominican Republic, the United States did intervene unilaterally prior to formation of an inter-American force. Although severely criticized for its actions in the Dominican situation, the United States is at least assured that a Communist government will not become established there in the foreseeable future.

This thesis analyzes the courses of action open to the United States in combating communism in Latin America. Threatened Communist assumptions of power via legal and forcible means are considered. It is concluded that under no circumstances should the United States stand idly by while another Communist government is established in this hemisphere. Action to contain communism preferably should be taken through the Organization of American States. However, should the OAS be unwilling or unable to take the proper countermeasures, the United States should not hesitate to take the unilateral action necessary to prevent Communist expansion.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS COMMUNISM

The United States has long advocated the principle of self-determination for all peoples. In addition, the principle provides a cornerstone upon which the United Nations is founded. In an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1961, President Kennedy emphasized the position of the United States in this regard when he stated: "That continuing tide of self-determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support."¹ Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a public address in 1964 elaborated when he said:

Let me return to a scarlet thread of American policy. When we were uniting ourselves as a nation of some 3 million people determined to be free, Thomas Jefferson proclaimed that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Let us recall that our Founding Fathers considered it to be a proposition for all mankind and not merely for the American colonies. That remains our commitment and the basis of our concern with communism.²

As indicated by Mr. Rusk, communism is incompatible with self-determination. The spread of communism by the usual forcible methods of revolution is not in accord with democratic processes. A Communist government established by a so-called "War of Liberation" does not

¹John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the Presidents - 1961, Item 387, p. 523.

²Dean Rusk, "Toward Victory for Freedom," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1319, 5 Oct. 1964, p. 467.

derive its just powers from the consent of the governed. An assumption of power of this nature is through the will of a small minority who offer only a pretext of speaking for the people. Accordingly, there is a basic ideological conflict between the democratic and communistic societies. Yet, the ultimate goal of international communism obviously is world domination. The United States, being the leader of the Free World, opposes communism on a worldwide basis.

Not even the "back yard" of the United States, Latin America, is immune to Communist penetration. As early as 1919, Communist parties, or parties inclined toward Communist ideology were organized in various Latin American countries. This area soon achieved a high degree of importance to the objectives of international communism. At the 1934 Congress of the Third International (Comintern), held in Moscow, it was officially stated that "The Latin American question is of major interest, for the policy we adopt there will serve as a precedent for other parts of the world."³ Communist China also began to exert concentrated effort in Latin America in 1958. Lin Piao, China's Minister of National Defense, specifically included Latin America as a target for Chinese communism when he wrote the following in 1965: "In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African,

³Pan American Union, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, p. 11.

and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population."⁴

IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

The United States is particularly concerned with Communist activities in Latin America. This concern is not predicated entirely on such high-sounding, altruistic concepts as "good neighborliness" or "humanitarian considerations."⁵ National self-interest of the United States is involved. Several aspects contribute to the importance of Latin America to the national interests of the United States.

The first is military security. A glance at the map shows that Mexico, the Caribbean area, and Northern South America provide a "back yard" with a "rear door" directly into the United States. A Communist or Communist-dominated regime in this area would constitute a military threat to the United States. The second aspect is the fact that Latin America is the source for the United States of approximately 35 strategic materials. A few of these, especially Chilean copper, Venezuelan petroleum, Brazilian quartz crystals, and Guiana bauxite, have been vital for some time. The third point is provided by the vast American economic interests in Latin America. About 30 percent of the total foreign private investment of the United States is in Latin America. To this large investment must be

⁴Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Daily Report Supplement, Far East, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, No. 171 (4S), 3 Sep. 1965, p. 22.

⁵Thomas W. Palmer, Jr., Search for a Latin American Policy, p. 17.

added a total export-import trade of almost the same magnitude. Thus in terms of private business relations, Latin America rates higher for the United States than any other part of the globe. In addition, Latin America can generally be relied upon to provide political support to the United States. This support is particularly valuable in debates of public issues in the United Nations, where the Soviet-Chinese nations normally vote as a bloc. As a last aspect of the importance of Latin America to the United States, an international example has been set by the inter-American system for handling disputes and for protecting one another against outside aggression. The system has served as an example, for it has taught member nations to exercise restraint in the face of frequent provocation.⁶

U.S. DILEMMA IN LATIN AMERICA

The United States has long recognized the importance of Latin America. Historic ties between the two parts of the Western Hemisphere have developed throughout the years. As a result, the United States cannot accept a Communist government there under any circumstances. Such a foreign dominated regime would be inherently hostile to the United States and implicitly contrary to the best interests of the United States. Yet, communism continues its penetration efforts in Latin America. Cuba and the Dominican Republic provide examples of these efforts.

⁶Ibid., pp. 18-30.

By the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the United States and the Latin American countries are committed to a policy of collective security. Common action against an aggressor in the Western Hemisphere is to be taken through the Organization of American States (OAS). The United States and the Latin American countries are bound not to intervene unilaterally into the affairs of another member state.

However, U.S. self-interests demand that communism be prevented from spreading further in Latin America. In preventing this expansion, the United States is obligated to work through the OAS. For a number of reasons, the OAS may be reluctant or slow to resist communism in Latin America. For example, Latin American countries may not clearly recognize the threat to their national interests, or these countries may not possess the will or capability to oppose Communist aggression. The OAS may delay for debate until it is too late to prevent a Communist takeover. It therefore appears that the United States may be faced with the dilemma of abiding by its collective security commitments, but at the same time, of leading the fight against communism.

This paper analyzes this dilemma. Past U.S. policies toward Latin America are reviewed; communism in Latin America is discussed; and present U.S. and OAS commitments to collective security are presented. Case history studies of the establishment of a Communist government in Cuba and of the recent revolt in the Dominican Republic are included in order to portray the results of U.S. actions in each situation. Conclusions are reached concerning alternatives open to the United States in the future in opposing communism in Latin America.

CHAPTER 2

PAST U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Policies of the United States toward Latin America have evolved over the years since the countries of both parts of the Western Hemisphere were in their infancy. An historical review in general terms of past United States attitudes and relations with Latin America may enhance understanding of current policies.

LATIN AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

With the founding of the American colonies, not only a new country but also a new social order developed in the New World. The notion was prevalent at the time that the break with Europe should be as complete as possible. It was considered that the New World and the Old World were completely separate and that nonentanglement should be the true basis of American foreign policy.

Events in Latin America soon brought into clearer focus the popular belief of the separation of the Old and New Worlds. The Napoleonic invasion of Spain provided the impetus for revolt in the Spanish colonies of the New World. Juntas were established in 1810 in several Latin-American colonies ostensibly for the purpose of holding the countries for King Ferdinand of Spain. However, it soon became apparent that these movements were the beginning of a struggle for independence. Sympathy for the cause of Latin American independence was widespread in the United States. The new Latin American republics were considered to be part of the same world as the United

States, completoly separate and distinct from the Old World. By 1821, the facts of the situation pointed toward the complete success of the Latin American revolutions. In 1822, the United States recognized the former Spanish colonies as independent nations.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

In the meantime, the sovereigns of Europe had bound themselves together in a union called "The Holy Alliance." There was concern in the United States that The Holy Alliance would act in the New World to restore to Spain her former colonies. This concern resulted in the Monroe Doctrine which was included in President Monroe's message to Congress on 2 December 1823. His message contains two widely separated passages which pertain to Latin America. Early in the address, Monroe stated that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European powers."¹

In the closing paragraphs of the address, Monroe stated the following:

We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered

¹James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 209.

and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.²

The Monroe Doctrine informed the world, in particular the European chancelleries, of the American attitude toward the new republics of Latin America. It asserted the superiority of American institutions and implied the danger to the United States of any attempt on the part of the European powers to extend their political system to the New World.

The Monroe Doctrine was in reality an expression of faith. It did not provide justifiable reasons for United States opposition to European activity in Latin America. Dexter Perkins, author of a classical history of the Monroe Doctrine, and accepted as an authority on the subject, states with assurance that the Holy Alliance had no designs on the New World at the time of the Monroe Doctrine.³ The United States possessed little power with which to enforce the ultimatum issued. Most continental nations regarded the doctrine as the nonsensical utterances of an upstart weakling. Only irritation and little heed were paid initially by these states. Of significance, however, is the fact that there were no protests on the part of any Continental power. Also of significance is the fact that a history

²Ibid., p. 218.

³Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 54.

of the Monroe Doctrine for the next century represents a history of United States relations with Latin America.

For the next several years, the Monroe Doctrine represented little more than words. Opportunities presented themselves for invocation of the doctrine, but the American government remained disinterested. In each instance, the United States maintained an attitude of quiescence. For example, in 1838, France attempted two separate naval enterprises in the New World. One was a blockade of Mexico and the other, a blockade of Argentina. The United States was quite content to let Great Britain interpose its good offices and bring both disputes to a close. Also during the 1830's, the United States maintained an attitude of indifference to British encroachments in Latin America. Great Britain occupied the Falkland Islands, extended the boundaries of British Honduras, seized the island of Ruatan, and consolidated its protectorate of the Mosquito Indians on the west coast of what is now Nicaragua. None of these acts provoked a protest from the United States.

President James K. Polk attempted to revive the Monroe Doctrine. In his annual message to Congress in 1845, he quoted pertinent paragraphs of Monroe's message and emphasized that "This principle will apply with greatly increased force. . . ."⁴ However, Polk's message failed to influence decisively any pending negotiation since the United States did not possess the material power to back up the words.

⁴Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IV, pp. 398-399.

Polk's declaration served only as a reminder of a principle of American foreign policy.

British encroachments in Central America continued in spite of Polk's reaffirmation of the Monroe declaration. In 1848, Great Britain occupied Greytown and claimed it as part of the Mosquito Kingdom. Greytown was significant because it was planned to be one terminus of an interoceanic canal to be built across Nicaragua. Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua appealed to the United States under the Monroe principles of 1823. The ensuing controversy resulted in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 between the United States and Great Britain.

This treaty provided for the joint protection of the projected canal, and the two governments agreed that they would not "erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, fortify or colonize, or assume or exercise any domination over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America."⁵ However, the ambiguous language of the treaty did not prevent Great Britain from further extension of its influence in Central America. In 1852, the British declared that Ruatan, Bonacca, and four neighboring islands were formed into the British Colony of the Bay Islands.

⁵Perkins, op. cit., p. 96.

APPLICATION OF MONROE DOCTRINE

It was apparent that by the 1860's, the United States was growing into the material power necessary to back up the Monroe Doctrine. The principles were beginning to root both in America and in Europe. Controversy raged in the U.S. Congress concerning enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in regard to British annexation of the Bay Islands. Diplomatic notes on the matter were exchanged between the United States and Britain. Although British political leaders did not acknowledge the binding force of Monroe's principles, in practice, the British retreated in Central America. By agreement reached in 1860, Britain returned the Bay Islands to Honduras; the Mosquites were recognized as under the sovereignty of Nicaragua and Honduras; and Greytown was made a free port. This instance represents the first successful application of the Monroe Doctrine.

There were other applications. In 1861, Louis Napoleon of France had attempted to establish a monarchy in Mexico under Archduke Maximilian. As the Civil War drew to a close, the American Secretary of State, William H. Seward, undertook a series of dispatches with the French, who were diplomatically pushed step by step out of Mexico. Similarly, the Monroe Doctrine was a dominant factor in bringing about the downfall in 1865 of the Spanish reoccupation of Santo Domingo, now called the Dominican Republic. Santana, the President of Santo Domingo, supposedly had turned his country over to Spain as a result of the will of his people. Nevertheless, under U.S. pressure, the Spanish withdrew from the island after armed opposition to the Spanish regime developed.

In this latter case, the people of Santo Domingo theoretically exercised their right of self-determination in returning to Spanish rule. However, the Spanish regime in Santo Domingo, once established, proved to be extremely unpopular. Dexter Perkins states the following in this regard:

The self-determination of Santo Domingo in 1861 was a farce, and nothing more; the speedy development of armed opposition was to testify to this fact; but the regime of Santana had gone through all the forms of respecting the popular will; and whatever the real facts may have been, it was highly embarrassing to Seward, as it may easily prove to be embarrassing to some future Secretary of State, to question the procedure. It is by just such a plausible argument as this, and by such means as were employed by Spain in Santo Domingo, that the subversion of American liberties is likely to come about, if it comes about at all.⁶

Perkins refers to modern-day Communist efforts to penetrate the Western Hemisphere. He considers that Santo Domingo of the 1860's provides an example of how communism may succeed in the Western Hemisphere.

EXTENSION OF MONROE DOCTRINE

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, American statesmen expanded the Monroe Doctrine to incorporate new principles. The first corollary was expressed by President Grant in 1870 when he stated:

The doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it

⁶Ibid., p. 143.

proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power.⁷

Another corollary that began to take shape during this period was that of preventive action. The concept involved action by the United States in order to forestall the use of force by European powers in the New World.⁸

These two extensions to the Monroe Doctrine were tested in the controversy over the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary. This dispute brewed off and on from the 1840's to the 1890's. It was based upon British claim to territory which the government in Caracas considered to be part of Venezuela. Rupture in relations between Great Britain and Venezuela resulted. Venezuela appealed to the United States for assistance under the Monroe Doctrine. President Cleveland issued a virtual ultimatum to Great Britain demanding that the dispute be arbitrated. Initially reluctant, the British finally agreed in 1896 to a prescribed period of fifty years' occupation of the disputed territory as decisive of title. The final settlement on this basis greatly restricted the claims of the British government.

A third corollary added during this period indicated that European participation in an interoceanic canal project would be regarded as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. This concept culminated in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which replaced the

⁷Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII, p. 61.

⁸Perkins, op. cit., p. 163.

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and which assured complete American control of any transisthmian canal to be built. Shortly thereafter, with covert encouragement from the United States, Panama achieved its independence from Colombia, and the way was cleared for construction of the Panama Canal. Construction began in 1904 and was completed ten years later.⁹

In 1898, the United States intervened in Spain's attempt to put down rebellion in Cuba, which was then a Spanish colony. This interposition of the United States was brought about by the dangers and inconvenience of nearby revolt, by the shocking barbarities of the Cuban struggle, by the large U.S. economic interests in Cuba, and by the duty to protect U.S. citizens.¹⁰ Many considered this action to be a violation of Monroe's assertion in 1823 that the United States would not interfere ". . . with the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power." Nevertheless, the Spanish-American War was fought but was over quickly. As a result, Spain relinquished her title to Cuba, and Americans occupied the island. By the Platt Amendment of 1901, it was stipulated that American forces would withdraw from Cuba but that the government of Cuba should consent to the exercise of an American right of intervention "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging its obligations with respect to Cuba."¹¹ The Platt Amendment remained in effect until 1934.

⁹Ibid., p. 194.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 195.

¹¹Ibid., p. 231.

During Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, the thesis became prevalent that if the United States would not permit others to intervene in Latin American affairs, it ought to intervene itself to prevent or correct chronic wrongdoing. This thesis was expressed in 1904 when Theodore Roosevelt declared that:

In the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.¹²

Thus the "Big Stick" or Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was born. Under this policy, the United States intervened in the internal affairs of Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and Haiti in order to preclude forcible intervention by a European power. This intervention varied in form from U.S. control of a country's customs to actual landings of U.S. armed forces. The Roosevelt Corollary was actively implemented by the United States through the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson. A general attitude of distrust by the Latin American countries toward the United States resulted.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Pan-Americanism began to be discussed in the Western Hemisphere. The First International Conference of American States was held at Washington in

¹²Edward Boykin, ed., Theodore Roosevelt's Fourth State-of-the-Union Message, in State of the Union, pp. 354-355.

1889.¹³ This new attitude became prevalent during the Hoover administration and was consummated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in what he called the "Good Neighbor Policy." It is generally considered that the basis of this policy was a memorandum dated 17 December 1928, prepared by J. Reuben Clark, Undersecretary of State. The Clark memorandum sought to divorce Monroeism from the idea of intervention.¹⁴ The new concept was placed in official terms at the Seventh International Conference of American States held at Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1933, at which the United States agreed to a nonintervention formula in the internal or external affairs of the Latin American states.¹⁵ This new doctrine was elaborated upon in 1936, at which time the American states signed a new protocol declaring "inadmissible" the intervention of any American state in the affairs of another "directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason." The protocol went further to stipulate that "the violation of the provisions of this Article shall give rise to mutual consultations, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment." Finally, it provided that "every question concerning the interpretation of the present Additional Protocol, which it has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels" should be submitted either to conciliation, or to arbitration, or to judicial settlement.¹⁶

¹³Perkins, op. cit., pp. 342-343.

¹⁴Charles G. Fenwick, The Inter-American Regional System, p. 18.

¹⁵US Dept of State, Conference Series No. 19, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International Conference of American States, pp. 18-19.

¹⁶Pan American Union. Congress and Conference Series No. 27, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, p. 34.

At a conference in Havana in 1940, the American states, to include the United States, adopted a declaration which brought the principles of collective security into the political field of Latin America. This declaration stated:

That any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration. In case acts of aggression are committed or should there be reason to believe that an act of aggression is being prepared by a non-American nation against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American nation, the states signatory to the present declaration will consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measures it may be advisable to take.¹⁷

This statement was designed primarily to establish international control of any Latin American territory which might have been in danger of falling into Hitler's hands. However, after World War II and at the insistence of the Latin governments, another conference of American states was called at Chapultepec, near Mexico City, in 1945. There, the principles of western hemispheric defense were again asserted. It was agreed that an attack against one American State would be considered an attack against them all.

A new Pan American conference met at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 to confirm by treaty the principles of collective security of the Western Hemisphere. The resulting Inter-American Treaty of

¹⁷Pan American Union. Congress and Conference Series No. 32, Report of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, p. 35.

Reciprocal Assistance defined aggression in explicit terms, listed measures of sanction, and provided the procedures for initiating common action against a law breaking state.¹⁸

The American States next undertook the drafting of an "Organic Pact" which would give juridical form and structure to their regional organization, at that time called the Union of American Republics. The document submitted to the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogotá, Columbia, in 1948, was adopted, with revisions, as the Charter of the Organization of American States. This Charter integrated in concrete form the principles, purposes, and policies that had been in the making since 1889.¹⁹

In 1961, a new era began in United States' relations with Latin America. In March 1961, President Kennedy outlined a ten-point program, called the Alliance for Progress. This program emphasized the need for more self-help as well as additional American aid, for ending injustice as well as poverty, for reform as well as relief.²⁰ The Alliance for Progress came into being officially at a meeting in August 1961, of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay. All members of the Organization of American States, with the exception of Cuba, signed the Charter. It states in part that

It is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress to enlist the full energies of the peoples and governments of the

¹⁸Pan American Union. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Treaty Series No. 8, *passim*.

¹⁹Pan American Union, 70 Years of Unity, p. 11.

²⁰Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pp. 533-534.

American republics in a great cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires.²¹

The United States agreed to provide significant assistance in meeting this purpose.

It has been shown that the United States has followed various policies toward Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine expressed a protective attitude toward the Latin American republics. This attitude was based upon the determined belief in the separation of the Old and New Worlds. The Doctrine gradually grew in stature as the power of the United States grew. Under Theodore Roosevelt, the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted to require frequent United States' intervention into the affairs of Latin American countries for the sake of good order of the Western Hemisphere. Today, through various agreements among the American States, the United States is bound to a policy of nonintervention. Security of the Western Hemisphere is to be maintained through the collective action of the American states.

²¹"American Republics Establish An Alliance For Progress," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1159, 11 Sep. 1961, p. 463.

CHAPTER 3

COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Through the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, the policy of the United States toward Latin America was designed to counter the threat posed by such countries as France, England, Spain, Germany, and others. However, a new threat to Latin America has now developed. This new threat is international communism sponsored by Soviet Russia and Communist China. Communism has a foothold in Latin America. In this chapter, communism's progress in Latin America and its influence today will be reviewed.

COMMUNIST STRATEGY

In the early 1920's, the Communist Parties in Latin America were weak and uncoordinated. To strengthen the movement, the Communist Parties there were centralized in 1929 under the direction of a Secretariat responsive to Moscow. Since then, the centralized direction has been preserved. Strategy and tactics have been plotted in accordance with the resolutions approved at the numerous congresses, meetings, and conferences of the Communist Party and its related bodies.¹

¹Pan American Union, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, p. 9 (referred to hereafter as Pan American Union, Against the Subversive Action of International Communism).

The Seventh Congress of the Third International, held in 1935, at Moscow, established a concept of creating popular fronts through intensive use of intellectuals to participate in the various kinds of electoral battles. The popular front theory is contrasted with the insurrectional theory, which was supported by many and still is heavily supported by the Chinese Communists. This thesis of the "Popular Front" achieved considerable initial success in the labor groups of Latin America.² Since then, the popular fronts have served many Communist purposes in Latin America. They have participated in the election campaigns of democratic countries and in opposition groups in countries where dictatorships exist. They have supported popular movements on behalf of various causes, particularly revolutionary movements that have been anti-imperialistic in nature. The Communists have infiltrated labor unions, with a view to promoting strikes, and have attempted to win over student and young people's groups, especially through the exploitation of nationalistic ideas. Also, the Communists and their fronts have issued systematic propaganda about the USSR to awaken enthusiasm for international communism over the democratic system and have joined in false campaigns in favor of free trade and pacifism.

An example of Popular Front operations is provided by the case of Chile before and immediately after World War II. Chile had become a socialist dictatorship under Carlos Dávila in 1932. However, Dávila's government was overthrown before a thorough socialist

²Ibid., pp. 11-12.

revolution could be implemented, and Arturo Alessandri was elected President. Leftist groups broke completely from Alessandri and organized a Popular Front. In 1938, the Popular Front candidate for President, Aguirre Cerda, was actually elected. His regime was characterized by economic growth and social reform. After Cerda's death in 1941, the Popular Front disintegrated because of strife between the Communists, who were then friendly to the Axis, and leftists and liberals who were not.³ A leader of the Popular Front in Chile at the time was one Eudocio Ravines, who later broke with the Communists and recorded in detail his experiences with International communism in Latin America.⁴ In 1946, a radical, Gabriel González Videla, was elected President of Chile. González Videla revived the Popular Front, for he considered that the Communists might be useful allies. He included three Communists in his cabinet. After the Communists tried to take over the military and the bureaucracy and abused the President, González Videla dismissed them from the cabinet, broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc, and had the party temporarily outlawed.⁵

In 1950, representatives of the South American Communist Parties loyal to Moscow met in Montevideo, Uruguay, to develop new Latin American strategy and to coordinate the struggles involved. Recommendations of the meeting covered direct coalition of Communist groups with bourgeois governments, agitation to incite rebellion,

³John E. Fagg, Latin America: A General History, pp. 897-899.

⁴Eudocio Ravines, The Yanan Way, *passim*.

⁵Fagg, op. cit., p. 900.

deception of the masses of bourgeois governments, revolutionary extremism and sabotage, a united front of Communist Parties and all forms of organizations of the masses, and social revolution in any country that was "prepared." Although for the first time the Latin American Communist Parties were granted permission to determine their own objectives and strategy, the obligation continued to recognize the leadership and authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

There is no question that the Communists have achieved a degree of success in Latin America. Guatemala and Cuba are examples of this success. Communist success in Cuba is covered in Chapter 5. In Guatemala, communism started a marked rise when the military dictatorship of President José Ubico was overthrown in 1944. This was the cue for many exiled intellectuals, some with pro-Communist leanings, to return to Guatemala. In this latter category was Juan José Arévalo, who was elected President in 1945 when Guatemala's new constitution was adopted. Arévalo encouraged participation of Communists as individuals in the administration of political and labor groups. During the Arévalo administration, virtually all of the future Communist Party leaders were at one time or another on the public payroll. Domination of labor movements was achieved by the Communists. An organized Communist Party was established in Guatemala in 1947, although its existence initially was not proclaimed openly.⁶

⁶US Dept of State, A Case History of Communist Penetration - Guatemala, pp. 10-26.

The Communists worked loyally with revolutionary parties to bring about the election of Jacobo Arbenz as Arévalo's successor. This campaign was successful, and Arbenz was inaugurated President in 1951. The Communist Party of Guatemala emerged as an open and legal party. Arbenz, in coalition with the Communists, proceeded to place Guatemala on the road to becoming a Communist state. This path was followed until the Arbenz government was overthrown in 1954 by an anti-Communist liberation army led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Castillo Armas became Provisional President in September 1954, and Guatemala resumed a democratic course. Of the Communist overthrow, President Eisenhower stated that "The people of Guatemala, in a magnificent effort, have liberated themselves from the shackles of international Communist direction and reclaimed their right of self-determination." However, the Communist Party of Guatemala has managed to continue to operate secretly.⁷

Various subsequent international Communist meetings brought about the transition of Soviet Communist policy to one of "peaceful coexistence." At an important meeting held in Moscow in 1960, emphasis was again placed on Latin America, and it was decided that "Operation America" would once more be directed exclusively from the Kremlin. Solidarity with Cuba was a fundamental objective of the program developed.

In 1961, the Latin American Conference on National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace was held in Mexico City under the

⁷Ibid., pp. 26-59.

auspices of the Latin American Office of the World Peace Council. Its real purpose appears to have been to develop new steps to extend communism in the Western Hemisphere. Basic agreement was reached at this conference to pursue the campaign against the United States with the greatest possible animosity; to develop a plan for the economic emancipation of the Latin American nations; to set up a single Latin American central labor office; to encourage the formation of the Afro-Asian-Latin American bloc; to consolidate the advance of the Cuban revolution; and to promote a "conference" of representatives of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America.⁸

By this time, a challenge had arisen to Moscow's control of Communist activities in Latin America. Red China began exerting concentrated effort in Latin America in about 1958. At the Congress of Peiping held in 1959, attended by 20 delegates from nine Latin American countries, the Chinese Communist leaders recommended "insurrectional tactics against the advance of Yankee imperialism in Latin America" and stressed the urgency of creating an Afro-Asian-Latin American front.⁹

Subsequently, China has conducted an offensive in the American hemisphere involving propagandistic, economic, subversive, cultural, and other aspects. Communist China appears to be employing three methods of infiltration into Latin American countries. They are the

⁸Pan American Union, Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, p. 19.

⁹Ibid., p. 18.

direct immigration of Chinese military and paramilitary advisers into Cuba; the use of trade and cultural missions; and the dissemination of propaganda in Latin America by the New China News Agency (HSINHUA), which has staffs in 11 Latin American countries.¹⁰ Attributable to these activities is the fact that pro-China guerrillas are now active in Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia.¹¹

In January 1966, a three-continent (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) Communist conference was held in Havana. This conference called for "the use of every form of struggle necessary, including armed battle . . ." in advancing the aims of international communism. Although the Soviet Union managed the conference, leading figures attending were representatives of national liberation movements in such Latin American countries as Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru. It is implied from the conference that Cuba is the new world headquarters for a master plan to subvert Latin American governments and to accelerate guerrilla warfare in the Western Hemisphere.¹²

COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTHS

Until 1957, Communist gains in Latin America were offset by losses. However, since that year when the USSR astonished and

¹⁰US Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration Into Latin America, pp. 2-4.

¹¹Ibid., p. 20.

¹²"Havana Manifesto," Barron's, 21 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

impressed the world with the launching of the first earth satellite, the climate for Communist operations in Latin America has improved significantly. The present Communist Party strength in Latin America is reflected in the following chart.

COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTHS

LATIN AMERICA

<u>Caribbean</u>	<u>Communist Party Membership</u>	<u>Legality</u>	<u>Sino-Soviet Split</u>
Cuba	35,000	Yes	Neutral
Dominican Republic	?	No	Soviet
Haiti	?	No	?
Jamaica	0	Yes	---
<u>Central America</u>			
Costa Rica	300	No	Soviet
El Salvador	200	No	Soviet
Guatemala	1,300	No	Soviet
Honduras	2,400	No	Soviet
Mexico	50,000	Yes	Split
Nicaragua	250	No	Soviet
Panama	400	No	Soviet
<u>South America</u>			
Argentina	65,000	Yes	Soviet
Bolivia	4,500	Yes	Soviet
Brazil	31,000	No	Split
Chile	27,500	Yes	Soviet
Colombia	13,000	Yes	Split
Ecuador	2,500	No	Split
Paraguay	5,000	No	Split
Peru	8,500	No	Split
Uruguay	10,000	Yes	Soviet
Venezuela	30,000	No	?

¹³US Dept of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, pp. 7-14 (referred to hereafter as "State, World Strength").

As of January 1965, it was estimated that Communist Party membership in the 21 Latin American republics totaled about 285,000. A much larger number--perhaps four or five times that number--are Communist sympathizers.¹⁴ The largest Communist Parties or fronts are to be found in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, plus of course, Cuba, where the Communist Party is in power.¹⁵ The Communist Party of Argentina is the largest such party in Latin America, but it has only limited political effectiveness.¹⁶ The Communist Party of Chile is probably the most politically effective Communist party in South America¹⁷ with the party of Venezuela also being exceptionally strong.¹⁸ The once-powerful Communist Party of Guatemala has been trying with only partial success to reacquire a measure of the influence it had during the Arbenz Regime.¹⁹

Communist parties are legal in eight of the 21 Latin American States listed. The Communist parties of 11 of the 21 nations are pro-Soviet in the Sino-Soviet difference in views, while the remaining ten are either split or neutral. Many of the Latin American countries have more than one Communist Party with some supporting the Soviet Union and others leaning toward Communist China.

Communist success in Latin America has never stemmed directly from the size of the Communist Parties but rather from the ability

¹⁴Dorothy Dillon, International Communism and Latin America - Prospectives and Prospects, p. 36.

¹⁵State, World Strength, pp. 7-14.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 147.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 133.

of the Communists to associate themselves with popular national causes and to exploit nationalist sentiments, particularly those having an anti-United States orientation.²⁰ Labor, youth, and intellectuals have traditionally been the major targets for Communist efforts in Latin America, for it is among these groups that discontent, dissatisfaction with the status quo, and impatience for social change are most likely to be present. Probably the most dangerous threat from international communism at the present time lies in the field of organized labor.²¹ Communist methodology employed indicates that the main danger which Latin America faces today is not open armed attack but instead, subversion of political institutions in the interests of a foreign power.

²⁰Dillon, op. cit., p. 37.

²¹Ibid., p. 39.

CHAPTER 4

LATIN AMERICAN ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY

A more detailed examination of the current Latin American organization for security is appropriate in view of the Communist threat described in Chapter 3. The official bases for this security organization are the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, frequently referred to as the Rio Pact of 1947, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, drawn up in 1948. Original signatories of both of these important documents were the United States and the twenty Latin American Republics as follows: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

RIO PACT OF 1947

The Rio Pact of 1947 defines aggression as an unprovoked attack against the territory, the people, or the land, sea, or air forces of another state. The Pact lists measures of sanction, including the possible use of armed force. It provides that common action against a law breaking state might be taken by a two-thirds vote, and that the decision so taken would be binding on all States, with the sole exception that no State should be required to use armed force without its own consent.¹ Further, the treaty defines the

¹Pan American Union. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Treaty Series No. 3, *passim*.

scope of common action to include Greenland, Canada, and much of the polar regions within the operation of a collective guarantee.²

Thus, the States of the New World are bound to act together against aggression, and against aggression not only in Latin America but in the entire Western Hemisphere, broadly defined. In determining the extent of the common action to be taken, the United States has agreed to abide by the verdict of the Council of the Organization of American States, even though the U.S. vote may be in the minority.

CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The complementary treaty to the Rio Pact is the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which was signed by the 21 American States at the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá, Colombia, 30 March-2 May 1948. Article 6 of the Charter says that "States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise these rights, and have equal duties."³ This principle confirms the requirement for the United States to conform when outvoted.

Article 4 of the Charter states the purposes of the OAS. One such purpose is "To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression."⁴ Article 5 reiterates the assertion made at Chapultepec in 1945 that "An act of aggression

²Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 365.

³Pan American Union. Charter of the Organization of American States, p. 3.

⁴Ibid., p. 2.

against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States.⁵ Articles 24 and 25 are pertinent in this respect and are quoted below.

Article 24: Every act of aggression by a state against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States.⁶

Article 25: If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.⁷

Reference to "special treaties" in this latter article pertains to such treaties as the Rio Pact requiring the two-thirds vote for action. However, these articles concerning aggression in general are vague and do not spell out the specific conditions warranting OAS action. With many different viewpoints represented, it would appear that any decision for OAS action would require considerable time-consuming debate. This would be particularly true in those cases in which common action against Communist activities in Latin America was being considered. The Communist tactics of infiltration and subversion, rather than overt aggression, do not facilitate clear-cut decision in committee deliberations.

⁵Ibid., p. 3.

⁶Ibid., p. 5.

⁷Ibid.

Also of significance are the articles of the OAS Charter concerning intervention. Articles 15 and 17 are pertinent in this respect and are quoted below.

Article 15: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.⁸

Article 17: The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.⁹

Based upon these articles, it is apparent that the United States is forbidden to intervene unilaterally in the internal or external affairs of another American State under any circumstances whatever, and the U.S. has agreed to this principle. Any basis for intervention that the U.S. may have must be taken up with the OAS for consideration of common action.

OAS ACTION AGAINST COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

The OAS has taken steps to clarify its position with respect to communism. For example, the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1954, was called to consider the threat to

⁸Ibid., p. 4.

⁹Ibid., p. 5.

Western Hemispheric security posed by the pro-Communist government in Guatemala. This conference condemned "the activities of the international Communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs" and expressed "the determination of the American States to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence. . . ."¹⁰ Secretary of State Dulles pointed out that the Caracas Declaration ". . . made clear that collective action to eradicate international communism is not an act of intervention but an act to uproot intervention."¹¹ The declaration contributed to the success of Castillo Armas' liberation army in bringing about the downfall of the Arbenz regime.

The United States, as the leader of the Free World, is determined to contain communism, and it often appears that the United States is the only country with the power and will to do so. Yet, the Rio Pact and the Charter of the OAS bind the U.S. to a multilateral approach to hemispheric security. Based upon various declarations, the OAS apparently realizes the threat of international communism. However, serious questions are raised as to the effectiveness of the common defense system to which the United States is committed.

¹⁰ Pan American Union, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Conferences and Organizations Series No. 33, p. 94.

¹¹ US Dept of State, A Case History of Communist Penetration - Guatemala, p. 3.

CHAPTER 5

RESULT OF NONINTERVENTION: CUBA

Cuba provides an example of how communism can become installed in Latin America in spite of efforts of the Organization of American States and of the United States. Cuba is now a Communist state. It has been said that the post-World War II turbulence of the cold war, the Cuban's shame of widespread corruption; and his resentment of Batista's unexpected overthrow of Cuba's promising democratic development in 1952, furnished the necessary background of anxiety, distress, and crisis among the Cuban people for the Communist takeover.¹ This chapter examines Cuba's transition to communism.

REVOLUTION IN CUBA

Fidel Castro, the leader of Communist Cuba, began his revolutionary activities at an early age. In 1947, when he was only 21, he participated in an invasion of the Dominican Republic in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government of Generalissimo Trujillo.² Also, there is evidence that in the following year, he participated in tumultuous rioting at Bogotá, Colombia, during the preparation of the OAS Charter by the Ninth International Conference of American States.³

¹Ward M. Morton, Castro As Charismatic Hero, p. 7.

²George I. Blanksten, Fidel Castro and Latin America, p. 1.

³Ibid.

After graduation from law school in 1950, he was nominated an Orthodox Party candidate for the Cuban Congress from a supposedly "safe" district in Havana. The election never came about, however, for Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar seized Cuban power from Prío Socarrás in a coup d'état on 10 March 1952. From that day on, Castro seemed to possess a sense of mission to overthrow Batista. Shortly after Batista's assumption of power, Castro filed a brief with the Court of Constitutional Guarantees asking that Batista's government be declared unconstitutional. When the Court rejected the plea, Castro turned to revolution against the Batista regime.

On 26 July 1953, Castro led an attack on the military post, Moncada Barracks, at Santiago in eastern Cuba. This attack, called the 26th of July Movement, was unsuccessful, and Castro was tried for his efforts. In his own defense, he dedicated his revolution to "a new Cuba, clean of all past errors and niggardly ambitions." In addition, he mentioned agricultural reform, profit-sharing laws, and nationalization of public utilities, and he promised restoration of the Constitution of 1940. Most of these platform planks had been mentioned before in various reform movements of one kind or another.⁴ Castro was imprisoned until 1955, at which time he was released through amnesty, but he then left Cuba and spent almost two years in exile, principally in Mexico. He and a small band of guerrillas returned to Cuba in December 1956, and continued the revolution from the Sierra Maestra mountains in eastern Cuba. During 1957 and 58,

⁴Morton, op. cit., p. 20.

Castro often spoke of free elections, national sovereignty, freedom of information, agrarian reform, financial stability, and retribution for Batista and associates.⁵ There was, however, no clear platform that indicated Communist association.

In March 1953, the Committee of Cuban Institutions, which included virtually every important anti-Batista organization on the island, appealed to the United States to force the resignation of Batista and to insist on the holding of fair elections.⁶ A U.S. State Department emissary did inform Batista that he would have to hold fair elections or leave so that fair elections could be held, but the United States did not enforce its demand. However, the United States did cut off arms shipments to Batista. This action not only weakened the military forces of Batista but also undermined his regime psychologically for it appeared that the United States had withdrawn its support of Batista.⁷ In fact, there was a sharp division of opinion among U.S. State Department officials in regard to Batista and Castro, and this uncertainty helped to produce a U.S. policy that more or less drifted with events.⁸ There were rumblings in the United States of Castro ties with communism, but there was no clear identification of this fact or public condemnation of his activities. General sympathy for Castro's revolution prevailed in the United States.⁹

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 24.

⁷Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution--Myths and Realities, p. 39.

⁸Robert F. Smith, What Happened in Cuba?, p. 253.

⁹Morton, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

Batista fled Havana on 1 January 1959, and Fidel Castro entered triumphantly soon thereafter. On 7 January 1959, the United States recognized Castro's Provisional Government and expressed goodwill toward Cuba.¹⁰

REVOLUTIONARY AFTERMATH

Castro made an unofficial visit to the United States in April 1959. At that time, he stated to a U.S. audience: "We are against all kinds of dictators, whether of a man, or a country, or a class, or an oligarchy or by the military; that is why we are against communism."¹¹ However, Castro soon showed increasing signs of serving Communist ends. In this regard, Premier Khrushchev declared on 12 July 1960 that the Monroe Doctrine was dead. President Eisenhower responded by saying that he would "not permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere."¹² The State Department followed up the President's statement by reaffirming that "the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are as valid today as they were in 1823 when the doctrine was proclaimed."¹³ Despite the Monroe Doctrine, vigilance stimulated by the cold war, the OAS, and U.S. power, might, and influence, communism was planted

¹⁰A. G. Mezerik, ed. International Review Service, Cuba and the United States, p. 14.

¹¹"Castro's Cuba. Challenge to the Americas?" Great Decisions 1964, 1964, p. 49.

¹²"U.S. Stand Against Reds in Cuba Has Its Roots in Monroe Doctrine," New York Times, 19 Apr. 1961, p. 13.

¹³Ibid.

some 90 miles off the U.S. mainland. This fact was confirmed on 2 December 1961 when Fidel Castro declared: "I believe absolutely in Marxism. Did I believe in it on January 1, 1959? I believed on January 1. . . . I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life."¹⁴

Critics have charged that through its treatment of Castro after he came to power, the United States forced Cuba to the left and into the Communist camp. However, evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration actually leaned over backwards to maintain friendly relations with the Castro regime. R. Hart Phillips of the New York Times wrote:

The United States did not, as many claim even yet, push Castro into the arms of the Communist countries. It was one and one-half years before the U.S. took any action against Castro, despite the fact that Americans had been imprisoned without cause, American-owned property confiscated, the U.S. accused of all types of aggression, commerce practically cut off between Cuba and the United States, a vicious campaign carried on against the United States in Latin America, and armed expeditions sent out from Cuba to overthrow other governments in Latin America.¹⁵

In fact, Castro had expropriated almost \$1 billion in U.S. property without compensation before the United States imposed economic sanctions against Cuba.

¹⁴Pan American Union, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, p. 27.

¹⁵R. Hart Phillips, The Cuban Dilemma, p. 350.

OAS AND U.S. ACTIONS

Castro had no sooner come to power in Cuba than various Latin American nations began to complain that they were being invaded and infiltrated by foreign elements. The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened at Santiago, Chile, in 1959, to consider these complaints. This meeting resulted in the Declaration of Santiago which stated that "The existence of anti-democratic regimes constitutes a violation of the principles on which the Organization of American States is founded and a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere. . . ."¹⁶ However, the principle was reaffirmed "that no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. . . ."¹⁷ Two subsequent Meetings of Consultation considered the specific case of communism in Cuba. The resulting Declaration of San Jose, Costa Rica, among others, (1) condemned intervention by an extra-continental power; (2) rejected Sino-Soviet attempts to make use of internal situations of any American nation; and (3) reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention.¹⁸ In January 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held at Punta del Este, Uruguay. This meeting was significant

¹⁶Pan American Union, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Final Act, p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁸Pan American Union, Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Final Act, p. 4.

because it declared that "the principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system"¹⁹ and that "the present Government of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself outside the inter-American system."²⁰ Thus, Cuba was formally expelled from the OAS, bringing OAS membership down to 20. United States' efforts to obtain additional sanctions against Cuba were generally rebuffed.

In the fall of 1960, the United States implemented a trade embargo with Cuba. Then, in April 1961, the United States organized the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in which Cuban refugees were to liberate their homeland from communism. However, this attempt was a miserable failure.

During the summer of 1962, Soviet Russia increased its shipment of military equipment to Cuba. In spite of Soviet contentions to the contrary, the United States soon discovered that these shipments of military equipment included such offensive weapons as medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium range jet bombers. In unilateral action, President Kennedy demanded that the Soviets dismantle the offensive missile bases and remove the missiles and bombers from Cuba.²¹ Premier Khrushchev finally agreed, and this was accomplished. In support of the President's unilateral actions in the Cuban missile crisis, the Congress of the United

¹⁹Pan American Union, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Final Act, p. 6.

²⁰Ibid., p. 14.

²¹John F. Kennedy, "The Soviet Threat to the Americas," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, No. 1220, 12 Nov. 1962, p. 718.

States issued a resolution (S. J. Res. 230) in September 1962 which states in part as follows:

That the United States is determined--(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere. . . .²²

This expression of the sense of Congress implies that the United States may be obliged to take further unilateral action in preventing the spread of Cuban influence.

Castro effectively concealed the true nature of his revolution. Regardless of the reason, neither the OAS nor the United States effectively opposed the planting of communism in Cuba. Subsequently, the OAS expelled Cuba from the inter-American system, and the United States, in unilateral actions, organized the Bay of Pigs operation and forced the Soviet Union to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. However, Castro's Communist government remains in power and illustrates the consequences of the lack of effective intervention.

²²US Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. 103, Part 15, p. 20005.

CHAPTER 6

RESULT OF INTERVENTION: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Nonintervention in Cuba resulted in the establishment of a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. An antithetic event is the Dominican rebellion of 1965, in which the United States unilaterally and actively intervened.

REVOLT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The history of current problems in the Dominican Republic begins with the assassination on 30 May 1961 of the Dominican dictator, Rafael L. Trujillo. After Trujillo's death, President Joaquín Balaguer exerted efforts to liberalize political and economic life in the country, but his measures did not satisfy the vast majority of the people. To meet this dissatisfaction, in December 1961, Balaguer formed a Council of State which had both executive and legislative powers and which included representatives of the opposition to his government. On 16 January 1962, Balaguer resigned, and after a short attempt by military elements to assume control, the Council of State, under the presidency of Rafael F. Bonnelly, remained as the provisional government. In December 1962, the first free elections in 38 years were conducted under the supervision of the OAS. Juan Bosch, promising sweeping reforms and economic development with full respect for civil liberties, was inaugurated as President on 27 February 1963. Bosch lasted only seven months; he and his government were overthrown by military coup d'état on

25 September 1963. The leaders of the armed forces turned over power to another provisional regime headed by a three-man civilian junta. This group, headed by Donald Reid Cabral, agreed to surrender office to an elected government after a two year mandate.¹

In the spring of 1965 (24 April) supporters of Juan Bosch, the former president, began an armed uprising against the ruling triumvirate of Reid. These rebels, composed of civilian and military groups who wanted to bring Dr. Bosch back into power, seized radio stations in Santo Domingo and vicinity. They set off a wave of street demonstrations and declared that the Reid government was overthrown. The rebels were then confronted by a counterthrust of military leaders opposed to Dr. Bosch. Air attacks were directed against the Presidential Palace and other rebel strongholds. On 26 April, fighting mounted in intensity between pro- and anti-Bosch forces. A rebel regime headed by Acting President José Rafael Molina Ureña, supposedly holding power pending Dr. Bosch's return, armed thousands of civilians who roamed the streets clashing with the anti-Bosch forces. A U.S. Navy task force arrived off Santo Domingo ready to evacuate those among the 3,000 or more U.S. civilians in the country who wanted to leave. By the following day (27 April), anti-Bosch forces led by Brigadier General Elías Wessín y Wessín, who had overthrown Dr. Bosch in 1963, appeared to have gained the upper hand, as Acting President Molina Ureña agreed to step down. The United

¹"U.S. Policy Toward Communist Activities in Latin America," Congressional Digest, Vol. 44, No. 11, Nov. 1965, p. 264.

States began evacuating its citizens from the Dominican Republic. On 28 April, large sections of Santo Domingo were still in the hands of the rebels, but a three-man military junta, loyal to General Wessín y Wessín, was "sworn in." However, in the midst of full scale civil war, the junta's authority was purely theoretical.²

UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

That same day, on President Johnson's orders, 400 U.S. marines landed in the Dominican Republic because "American lives are in danger [~~and authorities ther~~] . . . are no longer able to guarantee their safety."³ This was the first such U.S. landing in a Latin American country in 30 years. On 29 April, additional U.S. marines and airborne troops landed in the Dominican Republic as savage fighting continued. The evacuation of American civilians went on. For the first time, it was indicated that the function of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic was not only to protect the continuing evacuation of Americans. It was announced that a mission of U.S. forces was also "to see that no Communist Government is established in the Dominican Republic."⁴

As U.S. troops continued to land, the Organization of American States, at a meeting called by the U.S., voted to summon the foreign ministers of the Americas to consider the serious situation in the

²Ibid., pp. 264-265.

³"Dominican Revolt--The U.S. Steps In," New York Times, 2 May 1965, Section 4, p. 1.

⁴Ibid.

Dominican Republic. A cease-fire proposed by the OAS and the Papal Nuncio in the Dominican Republic was accepted in principle by the rebels and the military junta but was not respected. President Johnson in Washington said: "There are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control."⁵ The OAS voted to send a five-man peace committee (composed of representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama) to the Dominican Republic to attempt to bring about a cease fire.

On 2 May, President Johnson stated that the uprising "began as a popular democratic revolution" but that its control was seized by "a band of Communist conspirators."⁶ He directed the continued landing of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic in order to "prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere."⁷ On 4 May, the rebels proclaimed Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó as the constitutional President of the Dominican Republic and called for withdrawal of U.S. troops. On 5 May 1965, a formal cease fire was negotiated by the OAS peace commission. This cease fire was virtually ignored, however, for over two weeks, for fighting continued during that time and still continues sporadically. The U.S. government made available to newsmen lists of Communist and Castroist leaders accused by President Johnson of seizing control of the Dominican uprising.⁸

⁵Ibid.

⁶"U.S. Policy Toward Communist Activities in Latin America," Congressional Digest, op. cit., p. 265.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

On 6 May, the U.S.-sponsored resolution to create an inter-American military force to help restore peace and constitutional government in the Dominican Republic was approved at a meeting of Consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers. On 7 May, the anti-Bosch forces set up a five-man civilian military junta, headed by General Antonio Imbert Barreras, to replace the three-man junta. There was no agreement, however, between the rebels and the junta as to the government to be established. By 17 May, U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic had been built up to about 22,000 troops. The United States offered to turn these troops over to the inter-American military force.⁹ On 21 May, a temporary truce was signed, and the United States began withdrawing troops not needed by the inter-American force. U.S. troops remaining are to be withdrawn on order of the OAS.

Finally, on 23 June, both sides accepted an OAS proposal to form a coalition government, and on 3 September, a provisional Dominican government embracing both sides came into being. This government was headed by Dr. Héctor García-Godoy who continues as the provisional President. At the end of nine months, general elections are to be held.

REACTION TO U.S. INTERVENTION

The United States landed troops in the Dominican Republic without OAS authority. It was "after-the-fact" that the inter-American

⁹Ibid., p. 266.

military force was created under the OAS. U.S. unilateral intervention provoked widespread criticism from many sources, to include the Latin American countries. The source of the criticism was the "widespread assumption--at home and abroad--that U.S. intervention marks a return to 'gunboat diplomacy.'"¹⁰

Cuba violently attacked the United States by saying that the Dominican people "were fighting the most brutal repression." Castro backers pointed to the U.S. landings as proof of Cuba's need for a large armed force to repel any United States attempt to intervene in Cuba's affairs. Hoy, the Communist newspaper of Havana, said that "the United States interference has, as always, been cynical, shameless and monstrous." Hoy continued by saying that the United States has used the same pretext it has employed "many times in the history of Latin America to occupy its countries, set up tyrannies, get hold of local resources, and trample on, strike and humiliate our peoples."¹¹

Chile expressed official criticism of the landings by calling for "immediate and collective action of the OAS instead of unilateral measures."¹² Venezuela called for an immediate emergency meeting of the OAS to cope with the Dominican situation. Peru termed the U.S. landings as "lamentable" and a "reverse" for the inter-American

¹⁰"Dominican Republic: The Necessary Risk," Time, 11 Jun. 1965, p. 33.

¹¹Paul Hoffman, "Cuba Assails Marine Landing; Other Latins Express Concern," New York Times, 30 Apr. 1965, p. 14.

¹²"Action by O.A.S. Sought," New York Times, 30 Apr. 1965, p. 14.

system. Further, Peru stated that "It is truly lamentable that in this case it has damaged the sovereignty of an independent nation."¹³ Argentina described the landings as intervention. Although U.S. delegates in the OAS insisted that, under international law, any nation may send troops to protect its own citizens where domestic authority breaks down, several Latin American delegates cited the U.S. action as a direct violation of Article 17 of the OAS charter.¹⁴

U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and its consequences prompted considerable debate in the United States concerning hemispheric security. In August 1965, Representative Armistead I. Selden, Jr. of Alabama, introduced a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives, designed to express the sense of the House on United States policy in this area. Known as the Selden resolution, it passed the house on 20 September 1965. The resolution (H. Res. 560) states in part that in view of the threat of international communism to the Western Hemisphere,

Resolved, that it is the sense of the House of Representatives that

(1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) in any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort

¹³"Peru Finds Intervention," New York Times, 30 Apr. 1965, p. 14.

¹⁴John W. Finney, "Washington Declares Its Right to Protect American Lives," New York Times, 30 Apr. 1965, p. 1.

to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵

This resolution supports the President's actions in the Dominican Republic and makes it quite clear that the House of Representatives considers that circumstances may warrant future unilateral interventions by the United States.

The Dominican situation presents a classic form the key problem facing American foreign policy in Latin America--a problem that has become particularly acute since the triumph of Castro communism in Cuba.¹⁶ While committed to a policy of nonintervention, the United States did intervene in the Dominican Republic. Regardless of discussions concerning the extent of Communist influence in the rebellion, however, it is assured through the U.S. actions that there will not be a Communist government in the Dominican Republic in the foreseeable future.

¹⁵US Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 173, p. 23453.

¹⁶"Dominican Revolt--The U.S. Steps In," New York Times, 2 May 1965, Section 4, p. 1.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Communism can come to a Latin American nation through two possible methods. The first is that a Communist government could be elected in a Latin American country. The Communist Party is a legal political body in several Latin American countries and thus is free to run candidates in any election of these countries. This method is exemplified by the pro-Communist Arbenz government which was legally elected to power in Guatemala in 1951. Legal assumption of power by the Communists is most apt to occur in one of the Latin American nations where the Communist Party is legal. Discounting Cuba, these countries are Jamaica, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.

A second method of Communist take-over is through the use of force. Such technique usually starts by infiltration and subversion by Communist elements and later bursts into full scale guerrilla warfare for control of the country. This methodology is illustrated by the case of Cuba where control of the country was obtained by force of arms without consideration of the popular will. Forceful assumption of power by the Communists is most apt to occur in such Latin American countries as Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala or Peru, where Communist insurgency is in the incipient stage.

No matter what course the Communists adopt to seek power, the United States appears to have two alternatives in opposing a possible Communist take-over in a Latin American country. The

first alternative is to intervene multilaterally through the OAS, a course to which the U.S. is committed if legal intervention is to occur at all; the second alternative is to intervene unilaterally, as in the Dominican Republic. Each of the two alternative courses of action will be considered for each of the two possible methods of Communist assumption of power. The alternative of no timely U.S. action to meet Communist expansion in Latin America would constitute tacit acceptance of another Communist government in this hemisphere. This course is ruled out as being contrary to the national interests of the United States.

LEGAL COMMUNIST ASSUMPTION OF POWER

The first situation to be examined is a Communist take-over or threatened take-over via the legal route. An example of such a situation would be provided if Mexico were to turn Communist legally. The United States would undoubtedly be severely criticized if the U.S. were to intervene unilaterally with armed force to overthrow a Communist Latin American government that had come to power through the legally established procedures of that country. Such a Communist assumption of power would represent the exercise of self-determination by the people of the country concerned. Armed intervention on the part of the United States would be contrary to a principle to which the U.S. has long adhered.

This leaves intervention through the OAS as an acceptable alternative under such circumstances. The United States should refer the matter to the OAS for consideration of the sanctions to be

imposed upon the country in question, if any. It is highly unlikely that the OAS would vote for armed intervention. Sanctions most likely to be imposed by the OAS would probably include economic and diplomatic measures designed to bring about the collapse of the Communist government. However, experience has shown that such measures stand little chance of success in the face of determined support of a Communist government by the USSR or Red China.

With another Communist government in Latin America and ineffective OAS measures to counter it, the United States would be faced with hard decisions. The best possibility open to the United States would appear to be the encouragement and support of indigenous forces in opposition to the Communist government in power. However, U.S. encouragement and support should not be limited because of fear of criticism that may result. The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba proved that half-hearted and insufficient support has disastrous consequences. U.S. support efforts should be sufficient to assure success. The downfall of the offending Communist government would more than amend for any criticism directed at the United States for its support efforts.

FORCIBLE COMMUNIST ASSUMPTION OF POWER

The second situation to be considered is one in which the Communists have come or are about to come to power in a Latin American country through the use of force. The alternatives of multilateral intervention and unilateral intervention are discussed in light of this situation. Through the example of Cuba, the lesson has been

learned that a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere is unacceptable. The United States should not stand still, as it did with Cuba, and watch another such government become established in Latin America.

The question, therefore, is whether U.S. action should be multilateral under the auspices of the OAS or unilateral. The answer to this question depends upon the circumstances. The U.S. should follow the course that appears most advantageous at the time.

In the Dominican situation, the rebellion began on 24 April 1965, and the first U.S. marines landed on 28 April, the same day the Presidential order to do so was issued. The U.S.-sponsored resolution to create an inter-American force was not approved until the Meeting of Consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers on 6 May. Thus it was twelve days after the revolt began that the OAS decided to act. Were it not for the early U.S. unilateral intervention, the revolt could have been over in favor of the Communists by the time the OAS responded. This past experience indicates that the OAS may be slow in responding to future Communist threats.

However, the United States is committed to multilateral OAS action if there is to be any intervention at all. It therefore seems only proper that the United States submit to the OAS any proposals for opposing Communist forces in Latin America. This procedure appears to be appropriate no matter what the time element is. Future U.S. action would then depend upon the timeliness and extent of OAS action. If the OAS decides upon timely and adequate

action to contain Communist advances, the United States should honor its commitments and participate with the Latin American nations in common action.

However, if the OAS is unresponsive to the threat, and particularly if American lives are in danger, the United States should act promptly on a unilateral basis. U.S. support for local forces opposing communism should be offered, and if necessary, U.S. armed forces should be deployed. Unilateral actions of this nature are considered to be justified under the circumstances in order to carry out the United States resolve to prevent Communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere. Once again, criticism of the United States would result from any unilateral U.S. action. Criticism would be of small significance compared to another Communist success in this hemisphere.

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